Enhanced financial mechanisms for post 2012 mitigation by Figueres, Christiana & Streck, Charlotte
Policy Research Working Paper 5008






Office of the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist
July 2009
Background Paper to the 2010 World Development Report
WPS5008Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5008
Despite the many calls to reform the CDM, its 
conceptual underpinnings are strong and it will most 
likely survive in the post-2012 climate regime. Some 
modifications may be considered in the short term 
to strengthen the effectiveness and transparency of 
the mechanism without modifying the Marrakesh 
Accords. In the medium term substantially increased 
mitigation efforts in developing countries may require 
a combination of three possible financial mechanisms: 
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the current activity-based CDM albeit improved, a 
second market mechanism that would seek to improve 
the long term emission trends of developing countries 
by promoting broad based emission reduction programs 
primarily in the private sector, and a third financial 
mechanism outside of the market which would be an 
incentive for the adoption of policy changes leading to a 
low carbon path, but where emission reductions would 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol are the first ever attempt to create and regulate a 
global commodity market under the rules of an UN treaty. In fact, the two project- based mechanisms of 
the Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) are the only two 
market mechanisms managed by the United Nations. Whether and how they should continue serving 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and which additional mechanisms could 
complement their mandate is the subject of this paper.  
As we assess the current performance of the flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, it is 
tempting to be unsatisfied with the results. Concerns have been expressed about the slow start and 
little transaction  volumes  under JI  (Korppoo and Gassan-zade 2008), but more repeatedly and 
vehemently  has the CDM been in the crossfire of criticism: the  administrative efficiency  of the 
mechanism has been criticized (WWF 2008; CAN 2007; CMIA 2008)  as much  as  its environmental 
integrity (Schneider  2007;  Wara and Victor 2008), its inability to transform the production and 
consumption patterns in developing countries  (Figueres 2008), and the incapacity to deliver the 
mitigation scale-up that is necessary post 2012 (Ward et al. 2008). However, hindsight is usually wiser 
than, and unfair to, foresight. Both JI and CDM came into being in 1997, based on the pilot experiences 
of the prior Activities Implemented Jointly phase.
4 The CDM was not regulated until the approval of the 
Marrakesh Accords in 2001,
5
The officials from Foreign Offices and Environmental Ministries who gathered to negotiate in Kyoto and 
Marrakesh had no experience with creating and/or regulating an international market.  When designing 
the CDM,  negotiators relied heavily on the insight  gained  from  negotiating financial mechanisms 
established under other multilateral environmental agreements as well as from creating and reforming 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
 and the first project was not registered until 2004. JI did not become 
legally operational until 2006 and crediting for JI projects was not allowed to start before 2008.  
6
However, the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol are more than  simple burden sharing 
mechanisms where industrialized countries cover compliance costs of developing countries and offer 
 With the Executive Board for the CDM they created a body that 
shares many features with the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of 
the Montreal Protocol and with the ‘additionality’ requirement under JI and CDM, a concept closely 
related to the incremental cost principle of Montreal Protocol and the Global Environmental Facility 
(Streck 2007).  
                                                           
4 At the First Session of the COP, the Parties to the UNFCCC decided to establish a pilot phase for Activities Implemented Jointly 
(AIJ) among Annex I Parties and, on a voluntary basis, with Non-Annex I Parties that so request. The COP decided to create the 
AIJ as a pilot through a simple decision under the UNFCCC. Decision 5/CP.1 in FCCC/1995/7/Add.1. 
5 The Marrakesh Accords were adopted by the 7th session of the UNFCCC COP held in Marrakesh, Morocco, in December 2001 
and confirmed by the 1st session of the COP/MOP in Montreal in December 2005 FCCC/KP/2008/8/Add.1 Decision 3/CMP.1 
(Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol), Decision 
9/CMP.1 Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
6 See GEF website at http://www.gefweb.org.   3 
 
financial aid and technology transfer. Negotiators broke new grounds when they introduced two 
essential innovations in the design of the flexibility mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol: (i) project 
investment was linked to the creation of tradable emission certificates; and (ii) private entities were 
invited to participate in the mechanism, provided that such entities were authorized by State Parties. 
Consequently,the mechanisms provide an intrinsic incentive for investments in greenhouse gas (GHG) 
abating projects.
7
Taking into account the pioneering character of the mechanisms, the CDM in particular tells a success 
story. The mechanism is expected to generate about 1.6 billion tons of CO2eq emission reductions by the 
end of 2012 (UNEP Risoe June 2009).
 Emission reductions resulting from projects in developing or transition economies are 
awarded with the creation of tradable carbon credits that can be used for compliance with emission 
reduction targets adopted by industrialized countries or imposed on private entities in these countries. 
The rules of the Kyoto Protocol thus gave rise to the global carbon market. 
8
international environmental conventions
 The private sector has embraced the opportunity and CDM and JI 
have attracted interest in industrialized and developing countries alike. In 2007 and 2008 alone, the 
CDM mobilized USD15billion in primary CDM transactions (World Bank 2009). These transactions helped 
leverage significant financial resources, USD 45.9 billion (CDM) and 3.3 billion (JI) - predominantly from 
private entities - into clean energy deployment in developing countries in 2007 alone (UNFCCC 2008a). 
In comparison, the GEF - the single biggest environmental trust fund and the financial mechanism for 
four   - received in August 2006 USD3.13 billion from 32 donor 
governments for its operations between 2006 and 2010.
9
This paper does not seek to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the very broad array of 
possibilities that have been proposed to expand CDM/JI and create new financial mechanisms for a post 
2012 climate regime. Instead, the paper attempts to discover the limited common ground that may be 
   
The flexibility mechanisms are unique in regulating a market dominated by private players that depend 
on a United Nations committee to approve calculation methods and projects which create the market’s 
underlying asset. Containing many commendable design features, they serve as a useful model for other 
emission trading and off-set schemes. The conceptual underpinnings of both CDM and JI are strong and 
it is likely that the idea of the mechanisms, in fact the mechanisms themselves, will survive the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. It is therefore timely to review the strengths and weaknesses 
of the architecture of the flexibility mechanisms in the light of the post-2012 international climate 
treaty. A healthy and strengthened CDM and a robust JI could be complemented by one or several 
financial mechanisms that deepen the emission reductions in developing as well as developed countries.  
                                                           
7 GHGs covered under the Kyoto Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). All GHGs can be restated in terms of CO2-equivalent (CO2eq.) 
by multiplying their quantity in tons with the 100 year global warming potential (GWP) of the respective greenhouse gas.  
8  The  official  forecasts for all projects having entered the CDM pipeline are at 2.9 billion CO2eq emission reductions, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html on June 16, 2009.  However, this does not take into account that . many projects in 
the pipeline are still at the validation stage and run the risk of never being registered or delivering below expectations even if 
they are registered. 
9 GEF Forth Replenishment, relevant documents on http://www.gefweb.org/interior.aspx?id=48 (accessed 18 June 2009). 4 
 
found among the positions of all countries participating in the current negotiations. We do not endeavor 
to define the science of what could be technically possible for some, but rather to paint the art of what 
may be politically acceptable to all. We then elucidate the legal foundations that would have to be built 
to effectively support the implementation of the politically acceptable options.  
The core of this paper is dedicated to investigating how a post-2012 climate treaty could incentivize 
greater emission reductions in developing countries. For the sake of completeness we will however start 
with describing the role Joint Implementation could have in such a regime. Moving on to the CDM, we 
will then summarize the current frustrations with the mechanism and review incremental modifications 
that  could  be considered by the Executive Board for implementation during the first commitment 
period, without requiring decisions by the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (COP/MOP) or changes to the Marrakesh Accords. In a next step we explore a potential post 
2012 scenario that combines three possible financial mechanisms to promote large scale mitigation in 
developing countries: the  activity-based  CDM  as we know it albeit improved, a  second  market 
mechanism which in contrast to the current practice under the CDM would seek to improve the long 
term emission trends of developing countries, and a third financial mechanism outside of the market 
which would follow a scheme of payment for environmental services that are not commoditized and not 
used as international offsets.  
 
2.  JI : THE PROMISE OF NEGLECT   
Joint Implementation as defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol formalizes the continuation of the 
Activities Implemented Jointly adopted under the UNFCCC but expands the concept by adding a function 
that allows the transfer of emission reductions between the partnering Annex I Parties. Joint 
Implementation is  thus  looking back on a longer history than the CDM and still counts on less 
experience. The mechanism allows the crediting of project-based emission reductions among Annex I 
Parties and adds an important element of flexibility to the Protocol.  
Yet, at the time of writing, there are only 208 projects in the JI pipeline, 173 are currently submitted for 
determination (the JI equivalent of validation) and six have been determined by the JI Supervisory 
Committee (JISC).    In addition to the projects submitted to the JISC under the CDM-like “track II” 
procedure, 36 projects have been directly approved by the authorities of the host country and are being 
developed under the streamlined “track I” procedure. In June 2009, renewable energy projects made up 
30% (8% share in terms of 2012 ERUs in brackets) of JI projects, industrial gasses like N2O and HFC23 
14% (28%), avoidance of methane leakage from gas pipelines 11% (23%), methane capture from 
landfills, coal mines and oil extraction 23% (24%), energy efficiency 18% (15%) and fuel switch 5% (3%). 
Of the track II projects in the JI pipeline, the large majority is located in Russia (101), followed by Ukraine 5 
 
(34) and Bulgaria (14). The track I projects are located in Germany, Hungary, Romania, New Zealand, 
France and Ukraine.
10
As a consequence of the relatively small number of projects, the international administration of the 
track II stream of JI is less burdened and remains comparatively efficient. The fire of criticism that has 
been opened on CDM does not, or to a much lesser extent, apply to JI. NGOs pay little attention to the 
mechanism since environmental integrity is less of an issue as ERUs are technically not offsetting any 
emissions.  The relationship between project participants, JISC and accredited independent entities 
(AIEs) responsible for determination of projects and emission reductions (the JI equivalent of CDM’s 
validation and verification) is characterized by a cooperative spirit. Identified problems, such as the 
delays in the accreditation of AIEs, are relatively quickly solved once they have been identified.
 
The number of JI projects is dwarfed by those in the CDM pipeline, which in June 2009 contained 4,417 
projects. The disparity in the numbers between JI and CDM projects is partially attributable to the fact 
that the CDM enjoyed a “prompt start” authorized by the Conference of the Parties  (COP)  to the 
UNFCCC which allowed the registration of projects starting in 2001. This means that the CDM’s Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs) obtained during the period between 2000 and 2008 can be used to assist in 
achieving compliance during the first commitment period. JI on the other hand can only generate 
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) during the first commitment period, namely between 2008 and 2012. 
While the CDM is managed or administered on the international level by a governance structure that is 
largely independent from host country performance, administrative capacities and GHG accounting 
frameworks, JI depends on emission limitation targets, allocation of AAUs, registries and the functioning 
of almost all other elements of the infrastructure of the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon credits generated by JI 
are nothing but AAUs in disguise, authorized for private trade, but generated by the host country which 
converts AAUs into ERUs based on the evidence of verified emission reductions. As a result JI is 
environmentally more robust than the CDM, but institutionally more vulnerable. It is also highly 
dependent on the functioning of domestic institutions: in order to participate in JI, countries have to 
fulfill a number of accounting requirements and compliance has to continue throughout the 
implementation of a JI project. Countries have to elaborate project approval procedures and be able to 
account for ERUs as part of their AAUs. Participation in JI also depends on political will. Until June 2009 
the Russian Federation has not approved a single JI project. These delays strengthen the feeling that 
Russian JI projects will not deliver timely ERUs (PointCarbon 2008b; GTZ 2008a), or at least not at the 
expected scale. Other countries like the Netherlands have decided not to host any projects as a matter 
of principle in order to avoid the export of emission reductions. 
11
                                                           
10 The data come for the UNFCCC website and the UNEP Risoe CDM pipeline. 
11 The JISC modified the rules for the accreditation of IEs at its 13th session in Poznán, Poland, to overcome a bottleneck in the 
accreditation which would have hampered project validation for years to come. The problems had been identified by project 
developers and IEs and triggered swift action of the JISC. 
 If at all, 
JI is suffering from an unfortunate neglect, which may well change once its important role is fully 
understood in a post 2012 climate regime.  6 
 
JI has been described as a wallflower, mimicking its much more popular sibling, the CDM which acts as 
the “young debutante that swept the climate change world off its feet and is currently everyone’s 
darling” while JI is “hoping to pick up some of the other’s charm, and not have to leave the ball alone” 
(Ratliff 2007). It is true that much of the public debate and international negotiations are absorbed by 
the discussion on the future of the CDM and, still, it is likely that JI as a mechanism that broadens the 
scope and reduces the costs of compliance for those countries that have assumed emission reduction 
targets will continue to play a role in a post-2012 climate treaty. Over time, more countries will choose 
to assume emission reduction commitments for the whole of their economies (by graduating to become 
Annex I countries) or by assuming some type of sectoral emission reduction targets or implementing a 
cap and trade system.
12 There have already been several requests of countries to be included in Annex B 
of the Kyoto Protocol
13
•  The possibility to mobilize additional emission reductions: 
 and some countries may choose to adopt additional emission limitations or 
targets as part of the Copenhagen agreement.  But even if they do not, targets and enhanced action will 
almost certainly be on the agenda for future climate negotiations, perhaps starting as voluntary, no-lose 
targets, and eventually become binding. The relevance of JI or a JI-like mechanism in this context is to 
incentivize private investment in GHG abating projects ahead or in parallel to government programs and 
its advantages include:  
o  JI broadens the scope and reduces the costs of compliance and encourages a broad set 
of actors (in Annex I countries) to engage in mitigation of climate change even if no 
dedicated climate change policies are in place.  
o  JI mobilizes financing for projects and programs that have little or no access to 
international financing sources. JI can also provide an efficient financing mechanism for 
related policy priorities such as renewable energy deployment, efficiency targets, or 
forestry policy. 
o  JI can complement domestic emission trading schemes by including offsets from sectors 
that do not fall under the emission trading scheme.  
•  Enabling the continuity of the legal framework: 
                                                           
12 Although Mexico is not an Annex I country, in December 2008 President Felipe Calderon announced the country’s intention 
to adopt caps on carbon emissions from cement and oil refining.   
13 Upon the request of the involved Parties,  in 1997 COP3 decided to delete the name of Czechoslovakia from Annex I, and to 
include in Annex I the names of Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia and Slovenia. In April 1999 
Kazakhstan stated its intent to accede Annex I to the UNFCCC. After long deliberations it was decided that Kazakhstan will 
remain a non-Annex I Party under the Convention but could become an Annex I Party for the purposes of the Protocol, 
including its intent of defining a quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment under Annex B of the Protocol. Belarus 
was included in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol in 2006; in order for that change to take effect three quarters of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol have to ratify the Belarus amendment. Malta has announced that it will request entry into Annex I at the 
upcoming COP in December 2009. 
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The GHG capped environment could  increase over time  should more countries 
eventually assume economy or sector wide GHG emission reduction targets. A  JI 
mechanism would allow the rolling over of CDM project activities from an uncapped 
into a capped environment and thus provide certainty to existing CDM projects for the 
duration of the approved crediting period. 
However, the current JI needs to be reformed to be able to accommodate future challenges, in 
particular the dynamic triggered by countries that could decide to move from the CDM to a JI 
environment by graduating to Annex I or by assuming targets for certain economic sectors.  
•  Effectiveness and Efficiency. The efficiency of JI can further be increased by revising a number 
of rules, in particular the concept of project additionality. Additionality in the context of AAU-
backed JI projects has less relevance than in the case of CDM and it is thus possible to focus on 
emissions rather than project additionality. That means that the additionality of a project should 
not be measured by its economic dependence on revenues from the sale of ERUs, as is the 
practice  in the CDM, but rather by its ability to deliver emissions reductions below a 
conservative emissions baseline. The establishment of baselines could be further streamlined by 
applying  a number of commonly agreed international principles or host country national 
priorities. 
•  Encouraging programmatic and sectoral JI. Encouraging further development of programmatic 
and eventual sectoral JI projects will allow Annex I countries to achieve considerable quantities 
of emissions reductions in a cost-effective way, reaching areas and sectors not usually covered 
by domestic or regional emissions trading schemes. Programmatic JI has been pioneered by 
Germany under the Track I procedure.
  14 At the 4
th COP/MOP requested the JISC to develop 
procedures for JI programs of activities to be implemented under track II JI.
15
•  Strengthen governance and legal framework.  The JI process would further benefit from a 
clarification of the roles of the JISC relative to the AIEs and the UNFCCC Secretariat, in particular 
where those roles differ from the corresponding allocation of responsibilities under the CDM. In 
order to protect the interests of private participants a set of strengthened administrative rules 
should guide the interaction of the JISC and the Secretariat with AIEs and project participants.  
  
•  Graduation to Joint Implementation. Negotiators have already been called upon to establish 
rules that allow the migration of CDM project activities to a capped environment of assigned 
allowances, either in the context of a sectoral emission limitation target or an economy wide 
(Annex I) target. Such rules would have to link CDM emission reductions to AAUs (or the 
                                                           
14 Three programmatic track I JI projects, all in Germany, have been determined at the date of writing  (UNEP Risoe 2009). 
15  The relevant draft decision of CMP-4 reads: Para. 6. Requests the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to develop, 
as soon as possible, definitions, forms, guidelines and procedures for projects under programs of activities implemented under 
the verification procedure under the Committee, bearing in mind the work of the Executive Board of the clean development 
mechanism in this area”. 8 
 
respective internationally assigned allowances) and to align the crediting rules and periods. An 
important question would be whether existing CDM projects in a country that becomes eligible 
for JI would convert to JI or remain CDM up to the end of the project’s crediting period. In the 
first case AAUs will need to be cancelled for CERs generated for emission reductions from the 
project and in the latter case questions arise on whether the project is also eligible for Track 1.
16
JI lacks the momentum and economic importance of the CDM. Many established CDM actors have little 
to no knowledge about JI and its functioning. Discussions on JI take place in small circles and so far the 
mechanism has not been able to shrug off the image of a tool for some niche players from Eastern 
European countries to play with. However, JI deserves more attention and care as a mechanism that 
may stimulate investments into GHG abatement projects in countries which have assumed binding or 
voluntary, enforceable or no-lose, economy wide or partial, emission targets. Review and reform of JI 
should therefore be firmly placed on the post-2012 negotiation agenda and lessons learned from 
implementing JI should be developed and disseminated, including to developing country negotiators. 
 
 
3.   CDM: THE EXPECTATIONS OF SUCCESS 
The IPCC has left no doubt that there is an urgent need to scale up mitigation to levels that go far 
beyond that which was intended by the Kyoto Protocol and its flexibility mechanisms. We now know 
that the CDM has fallen short of delivering the emission reductions needed to lower the emission 
trajectories of developing countries in the longer term. But the CDM must be recognized as a crucial 
starting point in developing country efforts to contribute to global emission reductions. The CDM was 
created in 1997 by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. So much has been accomplished over the past 
decade that we have fallen into a permanent inflation of expectations, which obscures our memories 
with respect to the genesis of the instrument. The short 10-paragaph text of Article 12 that defines the 
mechanism and its two goals emphasizes that eligible “emission reductions resulting from each project 
activity” shall be certified on the basis of “real, measurable, and long term benefits related to climate 
change”, and that reductions shall be “additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified 
project activity”.
17 Parties to the Protocol have since then elaborated the modalities and procedures for 
project activities and integrated the Executive Board (EB) as the operational decision making body, 
which is  assisted by various expert panels and working groups. The EB has established the 
Methodologies  Panel  and the Accreditation Panel, Working Groups on Small Scale  Projects  and 
Afforestation/Reforestation, the Registration and Issuance Team, and designated 44 operational entities 
to validate and verify projects.
18
                                                           
16 FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/INF.3, Ad hoc working group on further commitments for Annex I parties under the Kyoto Protocol, 28 
November 2008, Accra. 
17 Art. 12.5(b) and (c) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 With the recent linking into the International Transaction Log the 
18  For a description of all Panels, Working Groups and Teams see http://cdm.unfccc.int/Panels/index.html.  For a list of 
operational entities see http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/list/index.html. 
 9 
 
international operational structure for the functioning of the CDM is complete.
19
•  Questionable environmental integrity. The long term success of the CDM can be best measured 
in respect of its contribution to measurably mitigate the emissions of GHG. Such evaluation is 
not easy since the dichotomy in the mechanism’s design results in an underlying tension: unlike 
JI and emissions trading, the CDM creates “new tons” of emission reductions which can be used 
for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol targets and which lower the overall effort to reduce 
GHG emissions in industrialized countries. A stable supply of  CERs leads to increased GHG 
emissions in industrialized countries and is thus not always and for everyone desirable. On the 
other hand,  lack of  demand  deprives Non Annex I countries from needed investments and 
hampers the emergence of a robust and liquid market in carbon commodities, needed to 
eventually tag a price on GHG emissions globally (Streck and Lin 2008). In order to not dilute the 
environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol and its emission reduction targets, it is crucial 
that CDM emission reductions be “additional” to what would have occurred otherwise. The 
additionality concept of the CDM has been debated vigorously, some authors claiming that 
many registered projects would have occurred anyway (Wade 2006; Michaelowa and Purohit 
2007; Schneider 2007; Watanabe 2008) while practitioners in the field and business associations 
complain that the EB is being excessively stringent in its assessment of additionality, particularly 
in its use of investment analysis as a litmus test (IETA 2008; UNFCCC 2007a
  The volume of CER 
transactions more than doubled from USD 12.9 billion in 2007 to USD 32.88 billion in 2008 (World Bank 
2009). In 2008 transactions of primary CERs (purchases directly from developing countries) declined by 
12% over 2007 due to the credit crunch and uncertainties with respect to post 2012 market conditions, 
but the secondary market for CERs (spot, futures and options) transacted more than USD 26 billion, or 
EUR 18 billion, representing a five-fold increase in both value and volume over 2007 (World Bank 2009). 
The achievements of the past ten years cannot be underestimated: the CDM has in fact established a 
structure that facilitates a functional market by defining the standards and processes for creating 
tradable emission reductions, consolidating methodologies, streamlining procedures and reducing 
global mitigation costs. 
Success breeds rising expectations. As the supply of CDM projects has grown, and as the need for 
increased mitigation in developing countries has become clearer, stakeholders clamor for “more, faster 
and better” from  the CDM. The past two years in particular have seen a plethora of publications 
expressing frustration with the CDM. The main areas of discontent include:  
20
                                                           
19 As a result the price spread between EU allowances and secondary CERs decreased substantially (Michaelowa and Vasa 2008) 
20 Call for Input on Non-Binding Best-Practice Examples on the Demonstration of Additionality to Assist the Development of 
PDDs, Particularly for SSC Project Activities. Some of the comments prove the dissatisfaction with the additionality tool. 
 
) In between both 
arguments there remains the inconvenient  fact that additionality of individual projects is 
difficult to prove and even more difficult to validate, as the reference is by definition a 
counterfactual reality which can never be incontrovertibly argued or conclusively proven 
(Mueller 2009). 10 
 
•  Inefficient operation.  After a slow start, the CDM has seen an explosion of projects that was 
unimaginable in 1997 or even in 2004 when the first project was registered. Over the past five 
years the CDM has registered 1,665 projects and is gearing up for an additional 2,600 which are 
now in the pipeline.
21
•  Insufficient contribution to sustainable development.  The CDM was created with two 
objectives: lowering the cost of global climate change mitigation and contributing to the 
sustainable development of developing countries.
 After long delays the CDM system is now fully funded and the technical 
support provided by the Secretariat has grown to meet the demand.  There have been copious 
complaints about year-long delays in the approval of methodologies (IETA 2008), about the 1-2 
year time lag in the assessment of projects (Michaelowa and Purohit 2007; IETA 2008), and 
recently criticisms about the ineffectual operation of Designated Operational Entities (DOEs), 
which have become new bottlenecks to an efficient functioning of the CDM (Hoogzaad et al. 
2008). All of the above are realities, and at the same time we must recognize that the CDM 
system has grown in the manner in which we so often recommend for healthy institutional 
growth: in response to demand. One of the consequences of demand-driven growth is the 
inevitability of the delay between appearance of the demand and response of the system. The 
question now is how to further improve the CDM so that it can effectively administer its current 
and future growth. 
22 However, as a market mechanism that gives 
monetary value only to emission reductions and searches for the highest volumes at the lowest 
price, the CDM has been more effective in reducing mitigation costs than in broad contribution 
to sustainability (Holm Olsen 2007; Sutter and Parreño 2007; Holm Olsen and Fenhann 2008; 
Nussbaumer 2008). In this criticism most authors assume a definition of sustainable 
development that focuses on local stakeholder participation, local job creation, and small scale 
renewable energy supply  (Cosbey  et al.  2005; Brown  et al.  2004; Michaelowa  and 
Umamaheswaran 2006). When demanding a revision of the sustainable development definition 
under  the CDM, critics implicitly challenge the prerogative of the host country to define 
sustainable development. In addition, NGOs question the integrity of certain project classes, 
such as large or medium hydropower, landfill gas, industrial energy efficiency or afforestation 
projects and particularly criticize CDM funds going to destroy industrial gases in projects with 
little sustainable development benefits. Disregarding the stamp of approval which  host 
countries have given to such projects, NGOs find flaws both in the general acceptance of such 
projects under the CDM as well as in the implementation in the concrete case.
23
                                                           
21 It has been shown that not all pipeline projects move forward to registration due to barriers including financing, regulatory 
risks, transaction losses, etc. 
22 Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 From a climate 
23 Just to list a few: International Rivers Network & CDM Watch, “The Good, the Bad and the Dammed Ugly, Status Note on 
Large Hydro and Clean Development Mechanism”, 2003, available at    
http://www.irn.org/programs/greenhouse/pdf/gbduirncdmwatch.pdf; International Rivers Network & CDM Watch, The World 
Bank and CDM large hydros. Status Note for COP10, 2004, Buenos Aires, Argentina, available at 
http://www.irn.org/programs/greenhouse/pdf/COP10hydrostatusnote.pdf; News Release 27 March 2003, Brazilian groups urge 11 
 
change perspective, one could however argue that it is much more worrisome that the CDM has 
not  promoted sustainable development writ large:  it has not  moved developing countries 
toward low carbon development paths (Figueres et al. 2005; Wara 2007; Wara and Victor 2008) 
based on more sustainable energy production and consumption patterns and more sustainable 
forest management practices.  
•  Weakness of the incentive. The incentive of the CDM has been too weak (Sterk 2008) to foster 
the necessary type of transformation in the economy, without which emission paths in 
developing countries will continue to increase. The structure of the CDM has restricted the 
mechanism to a relatively small number of projects. The CDM was effective in quickly 
eliminating a substantial portion of HFC23 and N2O industrial gases which gave an early spur to 
the market although they contribute little to sustainable development (UNEP Risoe 2008).
24 
More recently, the CDM has shown that it can catalyze uptake of commercially proven 
technologies to capture waste heat and waste gases in carbon intensive manufacturing 
industries (iron and steel, cement, chemicals). Likewise, CDM has begun to support a wave of 
renewable energy projects, methane capture and use projects, and efficiency activities in coal 
mining, oil and gas exploration and distribution. However, NGO concerns,  and  even more 
importantly  the relatively low price of carbon,  have  impeded the CDM from appropriately 
addressing the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions globally – coal fired power plants.
25
•  Weak governance. The CDM has failed to develop a due process to guarantee fundamental 
fairness, justice, and respect for property rights. The overwhelming majority of the entities 
trading in the CDM market belong to the private sector. The CDM is unique in regulating a 
market dominated by private players that depend on a United Nations committee (the EB) to 
 
The single point practice of the CDM (until the appearance of programmatic CDM) has not 
supported any increased efficiencies in the built and household environments or transportation 
systems which comprise more than half global carbon emissions (IPCC 2007))and are the fastest 
growing sources of carbon emissions in the emerging markets (Pew Center 2002). Neither has 
the CDM supported sustainable livelihoods (e.g. improved cooking and lighting), or catalyzed 
energy access for the rural and peri-urban poor (Figueres and Newcombe 2007). The exclusion 
of deforestation emissions from the CDM has finally left the largest emission source of many 
tropical developing countries untapped by the CDM (Eliasch Review 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
EU companies not to buy carbon credits from eucalyptus plantation, available at 
http://www.fern.org/pubs/media/plantarpr.htm . 
24 The low number of HFC23 (22) and N2O (65) projects are producing a large share, 17% and 9%, of all expected CERs from 
registered and CDM projects in the pipeline (at the validation/review stage). 
25 As energy demand growth in some developing countries currently is satisfied with coal fired plants, the introduction of ultra-
critical coal-fired plants is both a promising and contentious issue. The first methodology for potential power plant energy 
efficiency and supercritical coal-fired CDM projects, AMCM13 was approved in 2007. The methodology determines its baseline 
emission factor according to the lower bound between the emission factor of the technology and fuel type that has been 
identified as the most likely baseline scenario and a benchmark emission factor of the top 15% performing power plants in the 
country that use the same fuel (EB39). 12 
 
approve the calculation methods and projects that create the market’s underlying asset. The 
credibility of the CDM market depends largely on the robustness of its regulatory framework 
and private sector’s confidence in the opportunities provided by the mechanism (Streck and 
Chagas 2007; Meijer 2007; Streck and Lin 2008). There are mounting complaints about the 
continued lack of transparency in the Board’s decision-making and the lack of predictability 
(IETA 2005; Stehr 2008). The governance structure of the CDM would have to be reviewed 
taking into account the need to supervise a rapidly growing market and to provide in particular 
private sector participants that are not represented in the COP/MOP, with due process, ensuring 
the conditions for fair and predictable decisions. 
Not all of the above issues will ever be solved by the CDM, but there is admittedly ample room for 
improvement  toward 2012 and evolution  beyond 2013, and there has certainly been no lack of 
suggestions on how to change and improve the CDM.  Here we do not undertake an in-depth evaluation 
of all those proposals. Rather we attempt to intuit the fine line of what may be politically acceptable to 
all Parties, given the facts that the financial mechanism(s) is/are intrinsically linked to the expected scale 
of mitigation post 2012 and that a 2009 Copenhagen agreement must occur within the constraints of 
the prevailing political realities.  
 
4.  POLITICAL REALITIES 
There are three main political constellations that shape the potential consensus around a future climate 
deal. First, the US (until recently the largest national source of CO2 emissions
26 and by all counts the 
most historically responsible) has made little attempt to reduce emissions. The new administration has 
assumed a more responsible position, and the expectation is that the US will soon undertake efforts that 
are comparable with other industrialized nations. In an address to Governors from around the world,
27
                                                           
26 China is believed to have overtaken the US in absolute national terms during 2006, see Gregg et al 2008. 
27 Governors' Global Climate Summit held in Beverly Hills, California, on November 18, 2008. 
 
President Obama declared: "We will establish strong annual targets that set us on a course to reduce 
emissions to their 1990 levels by 2020 and reduce them by an additional 80 percent by 2050. We will 
engage vigorously in climate change talks despite the financial crisis”. The cap-and-trade legislation 
sponsored by Representatives Waxman and Markey is making its way through the legislative process but 
it is unlikely that it will pass both House and Senate by December 2009. The political will has been 
established by the new leadership, but the procedural necessities take time. Even with all good will, the 
US will develop its domestic emissions regulations before it decides how to enter into a multilateral 
agreement. The consequence for the international agreement could be  either that the 2009 
Copenhagen COP/MOP may be suspended in December to be continued as a “COP-bis” in June 2010 (as 
was done with COP 6), or that the Copenhagen agreement, in close consultation with the US team, may 
have to be crafted as an architectural “docking station” where the major architectural design is set for 
the US to later “dock in”.  13 
 
The second political reality is that among the industrialized nations only the EU and Japan have been 
clear about their intended post 2012 mitigation level. Japan announced a reduction target of 9% below 
1990 levels, which lacks ambition and was hence not well received by the international community. 
Unlike the US where international commitments tend to follow domestic policies, the EU has had a 
practice of defining international targets first before deciding on how to attain those targets. Although 
the EU has been careful to differentiate its unilateral mitigation commitment (20% below 1990 levels by 
2020) from an additional 10% reduction in case of a satisfactory (from the point of view of the EU) 
international agreement,
28
•  Developing countries will participate only once all industrialized countries (including USA, Japan, 
Canada and Australia) have demonstrably taken the lead and developing country action will 
depend on appropriate incentives and financial mechanisms. 
 it is not guaranteed that member states would be willing to uphold the 
unilateral reduction level in the event of a failed international agreement. In fact, the Energy and 
Climate Change Package that was prepared for adoption by the European Parliament in December 2008 
was hard fought by many European countries. Thus the EU is under major pressure on the one hand to 
keep its member states to the intended reduction commitments, and on the other hand, to bring both 
the USA and key developing countries into the tent, a priority that could, at least in the short term, take 
precedence over their desired global target and timetable.  
The third political constellation is that of developing countries. They understand that the reduction in 
GHG emissions needed to avoid catastrophic climate disruptions cannot be undertaken by industrialized 
countries alone, even if those reductions reach 80 or 90% below 1990 levels. Thus the weight of closing 
the environmental gap falls on developing countries. However, developing countries’ contribution to 
global mitigation must consider that: 
•  Developing countries are not a monolithic group: there is a broad spectrum of economy sizes, 
which has a direct bearing on both responsibility
29 as well as capability
30
                                                           
28 The EU climate goal forms part of an energy and climate strategic package presented by the EU Commission on 23 January 
2008, and endorsed by the Council on 4 December and the European Parliament on 13 December 2008. The reference line for 
reductions has been defined as 2005, as opposed to the previous 1990 levels, due to resistance of some member states. The 
Commission proposal is available at  
 to mitigate. A few 
emerging economies have felt the pressure to contribute to mitigation efforts in the near term 
due to their current rapidly increasing emission levels and growing economic development 
levels. China, India, Korea, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa have all come forward with first 
estimates of mitigation potentials (see Appendix 1  for a summary of these estimates). In 
addition, there is a group of middle-income developing countries that are under less pressure to 
assume targets now, but whose growth patterns could lead them, under a business as usual 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/ets_post2012_en.htm. 
29 Responsibility could be proxied as either cumulative emissions or annual emissions, and either could be measured on a per 
capita basis. 
30 Capability could be proxied as either GDP or GDP per capita.  14 
 
scenario, to relatively high GDP and emission levels over the next 20 years (e.g. Chile, South 
Korea, Argentina, Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc). For these countries the effort would be to reduce the 
carbon intensity of their economic growth.  Finally the largest number of developing countries is 
comprised of small economies whose emissions are negligible now and in the future.  They may 
continue to contribute to mitigation efforts, but most likely under little or no international 
pressure to curb their emission growth.   
•  Developing countries will not immediately enter into economy wide reduction commitments but 
rather may sequence their nationally appropriate mitigation actions
31
•  As two thirds of future emissions will come from developing countries, they could potentially 
provide most of the mitigation needed for stabilization, but they cannot be expected to pay for 
it. As proposed by Spence et al (Growth Report 2008) this can be done by decoupling the 
payment for mitigation from the site of mitigation. As long as we assume that every country has 
to pay for the emission reductions achieved on its territory, developing countries will 
understandably argue that they cannot act on climate in a significant way because of inequity 
and their other development priorities which have to take precedence. Financial support for 
substantial mitigation in developing countries is made more palatable to industrialized nations 
by the fact that these are the most cost effective mitigation efforts. The UNFCCC Secretariat 
estimates that 68 percent of the mitigation necessary for stabilization is achievable in 
developing countries and costs 46 percent of the total global mitigation (UNFCCC 2007).  
 to gradually move up the 
stringency ladder. The emerging economies  could start with a focus on climate-friendly 
development policies without explicit mitigation commitments, and transit over time, based on 
demonstrated responsibility and capability, to limiting emission growth and finally at some point 
in time, to adopting emission reduction or at least emission intensity targets (Figure 1). In order 
to uphold the integrity of the system, all mitigation efforts, whether based on climate friendly 
policies or eventually on targets, would have to be domestically measured and reported, and 
independently verified. In order to ensure fairness and equity, the gradual incorporation of 
developing countries could be linked pari pasu to industrialized countries’ verified performance 
(e.g. in terms of both emission reductions achieved at home and the provision of financing for 
developing countries mitigation efforts). Moreover, an agreement would have to be reached on 
objective criteria for defining the thresholds that would trigger an increasing degree of 
incorporation of developing countries.  
The conditional transfer of resources from the industrialized countries for purposes of underwriting part 
of the mitigation costs in developing countries is what is at the heart of the CDM and will likely continue 
to be the modus operandi of the financial mechanism(s) that could be devised for post 2012 mitigation.  
                                                           
31 The Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP13 envisages “[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in 
the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building in measurable, 
reportable and verifiable manner.” 15 
 





Source:  Figueres 2007b 
   
 
5.  SCALING UP EMISSION REDUCTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
One of the main challenges of a post-2012 agreement is thus to define a framework which creates 
incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions beyond those mobilized by the CDM. The 
current discontent with the CDM has lead to a broad array of proposals on how to fix, enhance, expand, 
or evolve the mechanism. They include models under which emission reductions would be rewarded in 
relation to particular sectors or are built on various forms of targets, such as intensity, absolute or 
relative (action) emission reduction targets. Crediting of achievements could take place on the national 
level only or involve project activities, can be based on an initial allocation of allowances (cap-and-trade) 
or ex-post crediting (baseline-and-credit), and be linked or separated from existing carbon markets. 
Mechanisms that build on emissions trading can be directly or indirectly linked to Annex I carbon 
markets and can create credits that are not, partly, or fully fungible with existing carbon markets. 
Challenges of scaling up the current CDM to access broader emission reductions include: 
•   Environmental Integrity. Environmental credibility is a particular issue where emission 
reductions are credited as off-sets, thus not leading to an overall reduction but only to a 16 
 
displacement  of the emission reduction to a place of more cost efficient GHG emissions 
abatement. The current CDM is based on project-based crediting that is supported by rigorous 
checks and balances to ensure the correct number of credits are issued for eligible projects. 
These checks and balances include tests to make sure emission reductions are additional, and 
that any emission reductions are correctly monitored and verified. Environmental integrity of 
credits is seen as one of the key requirements of the CDM being able to be used to offset a 
portion of industrialized counties emissions. If the CDM is expanded to cover sectors instead of 
projects, environmental integrity depends on the accuracy of available data. Where sectoral 
approaches are based on baseline-and-credit system, the establishment of the baseline or 
reference emissions is crucial in determining the system’s credibility.  
•  Uncertainty over Demand. As any market, the carbon market is based on the notion of scarcity. 
Incentives to innovate, seek low cost emission reduction options and invest in relevant 
technology are dependent on an environment where the circulating number of allowances and 
credits are below the actual level of emissions. Cap-and-trade systems involve a stable number 
of allowances that allow governments and private sector entities to optimize their operations 
taking into account the cost of generating emission reductions. Where cap-and-trade systems 
are linked to offsets generated outside of the system, such off-setting opportunities act as a 
price valve by allowing covered entities to access additional low cost abatement opportunities. 
However, the linking to any non-capped environment entails significant risk. The supply of too 
many credits that can be achieved at costs significantly lower than those within the system (the 
so called “flooding”) may make the achievement of the systems primary goal of reducing 
emissions within the caped environment impossible. In order to ensure that credits remain 
scarce and prices high, the design of hybrid emission trading schemes normally involve 
limitations for the import of credits. In order to protect the EU Emission Trading Scheme from 
the flooding of CDM credits, for example, the market regulator has capped the number of CERs 
authorized for transfer.  
•  Market vs Non-Market. Any post-2012 international climate agreement will have to rely on a 
mix of market and non-market based mechanisms. Carbon finance and the private sector 
contributions to a future climate regime are essential to mobilize the required scale of funding 
while governments need to have access to stable resources to adopt and implement policies and 
programs that lead to GHG emission reductions. The carbon market has proven to be a 
successful way to involve private entities into treaty compliance. Any final design of a financing 
mechanism will have to be built on a careful modeling of the emission reductions that can be 
achieved, credits that should be issued, and market links that have to be established. Since it is 
unlikely that Annex I commitments can create sufficient demand for carbon credits to (i) ensure 
domestic reductions; and (ii) reward all reductions in developing countries with tradable carbon 
credits issued regardless of  whether they have been achieved by private entities or by 
government policies,  while simultaneously maintaining a sufficiently high carbon price, the 
demand for carbon credits will be limited.  17 
 
Without minimizing the need for more effectiveness, it is probably not realistic to attain anything more 
than incremental changes to the CDM before 2013.    While practitioners clamor for significant 
improvements, many countries are still learning the ropes of the instrument, and others are focused on 
the new agreement and tools for scaling up post 2012 mitigation. There is little political space and no 
energy to undertake immediate major revisions to the CDM before 2012, emphasized by the fact that 
developing countries have argued that most of those revisions would require an amendment to the 
Kyoto Protocol. Thus in order to organize the steps in a possible evolution, it may be helpful to 
distinguish among three levels of improvements/changes to the current CDM, which would ultimately 
result in three financial mechanisms, functioning in parallel and in a complementary manner to one 
another:   
1.  The activity-based CDM. Assuming the CDM will continue to operate within the general bounds 
of the Marrakesh Accords at least until the end of the current commitment period, there are 
incremental improvements that could be undertaken by the EB itself, some supported by a 
COP/MOP decision if it occurs, but not all dependent on that mandate. Changes undertaken 
now would presumably stay in place and some may only apply after 2012. 
2.  A trend-changing market mechanism.  Given the need to scale up mitigation in developing 
countries beyond what can be delivered by the CDM, it may be necessary to create a second 
market mechanism, inside or outside of the current CDM, inside or outside of the KP, which 
focuses on impacting long-term emission trends particularly in large emerging economies. In 
principle it could be put into effect during the first commitment period, but it is likely to be used 
as a compliance mechanism only in the next chapter of the climate regime, and requires an 
explicit mandate of the COP/MOP if under the KP, or of the COP if under the Convention. 
3.  A non-market mechanism. In the context of the post 2012 regime, it may be necessary to limit 
the scope of the market and create a complementary financial mechanism to promote certain 
mitigation efforts in developing countries without creating international offsets in order to keep 
the global reductions and timelines within the ranges demanded by science. This would require 
a COP decision. 
We discuss each of these possible mechanisms. 18 
 
5.1 THE ACTIVITY-BASED CDM 
Today’s wisdom demands higher emission reduction levels than those made possible through  a project 
based CDM, and many voices have understandably joined the chorus to expand the CDM (or create a 
similar mechanism) toward sector-wide mitigation efforts. However, it is likely that the CDM will remain 
an activity-based market mechanism, now and beyond 2012. By ‘activity-based’ we mean a mechanism 
whose logic is to measure tons reduced by individual projects rather than encourage a shift in emission 
trends (Figueres 2007a). In this system, baselines and additionality are determined at the individual 
project activity level, and the rules seek to differentiate those individual efforts that are better than the 
norm, rather than promoting a betterment of the norm. 
The Marrakesh Accords flow from an activity-based logic. To change that logic the CDM Executive Board 
would need a decision of the COP/MOP, and there no political will to make such a shift, and certainly 
not before 2012. Guidance emitted by the COP/MOP to the EB since 2005 has focused on incremental 
adjustments to increase efficiency, consistency, predictability and transparency of the CDM. The 
guidance has not made any substantial changes to the system or to the rules.
32 Over the next two years 
negotiators are not likely to consent to material changes particularly if they could lead to higher CERs 
volumes, for the simple reason that the market is not dramatically short, even considering delays in 
registration and underperformance of registered projects. The latest estimate of the demand for Kyoto 
units is about 2.4 billion tCO2eq for 2008-2012 (UNFCCC 2008a). CDM projects in the pipeline have the 
potential to produce 2.9 billion tCO2eq by 2012,
33  although transaction bottlenecks and project 
underperformance seem to put the more realistic supply estimates in a range between 1.6 and 1.9 
billion tons (UNFCCC 2008a).
34
Furthermore, the CDM may continue to offer developing countries the opportunity to engage in activity-
based offsets in the post 2012-regime. The operational structure that has been developed for the CDM, 
including the rules that apply to activity-based offsets, is only just coming into fruition. There are some 
countries that are not yet participating in the CDM and for which the current requirements of host 
country approvals remains a challenge. Most medium to large-sized installations in small countries can 
 Developing countries fear that a substantial change in rules could open a 
floodgate to supply which would overwhelm demand, tank prices, and cause environmental damage 
due to the offsetting nature of the CDM. Thus it is our sense that the CDM will not be subjected to any 
serious revamping during the first commitment period, despite the pressures from  stakeholders 
desirous of change.  
                                                           
32 Substantial changes to the CMD which were discussed under Article 9 negotiations at COP/MOP 4 in Poznan did not prosper 
and were deleted from the text, even before the entire Article 9 was dropped.  
33 http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html on June, 2009. 
34 The estimates do not yet take into account that the recent global financial crisis has decreased investment capital available to 
CDM projects that produce the supply of CERs, as well as slowed production in industrialized nations (thereby decreasing the 
demand for compliance offsets).  Figures are sometimes dramatic: Corus, a UK-Dutch steel maker owned by Indian Tata, has 
announced a 30% cut in steel production by March 2009, resulting in a cut of by 8,1 million tons of CO2 emissions. Other 
steelmakers have announced similar cuts according to PointCarbon, 2008a.  
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be effectively submitted as individual CDM projects, and micro technologies such as light bulbs and 
cooking stoves now have the option of being registered as organized programs of activities under the 
current CDM. The fact is, most developing countries do not need (and may not want) any other set of 
rules in order to supply their mitigation potential into the market. Small or least developed countries 
often do not have either the institutional ability to put in place complicated GHG accounting schemes, 
nor the eagerness to be distracted from more urgent development challenges. However, it is clear that 
in order to scale up mitigation in the larger emerging economies we must go beyond current CDM 
practices; this will be discussed below. Here we only emphasize that whether Parties decide to enhance 
the CDM post 2012 or to create another complementary market instrument, the option to participate in 
the offset market with activity-based projects will probably not be retracted.   
This is not to say that the CDM is a finished product. It is painfully evident that in order to deal with the 
high volumes of projects already in the system, it should incorporate several key administrative 
improvements and the sooner the better. In the following we list (i) measures that could be undertaken 
directly by the EB without changing the Marrakesh Accords and without the need for a COP/MOP 
decision, (ii) improvements of the CDM requiring a COP/MOP decision that revises the Marrakesh 
Accords without touching the fundamental principles of the CDM. Any changes undertaken by the EB for 
the first commitment period would presumably stay in place after 2012, while reforms that require a 
more profound reform of the CDM would likely only take effect in 2013. 
(I)  Improvements that can be enacted by the Executive Board itself 
•  Delegation to the Secretariat. Assuming that the level of CDM submissions continues to rise and 
that  nominations to the Board will, at least for the next three years, continue the current 
practice of part-time Board members who volunteer their time and do not have regulatory 
experience, it is inevitable that the Board delegate even more responsibility to the Secretariat 
than it has in the past.  Over the past 2-3 years the Secretariat has been adding and training staff 
to support the various functions of the EB. This trend will probably continue. One specific task 
that could be delegated to the Secretariat relates to issues where clear guidance from the EB is 
available and yet not complied with in Project Design Documents (PDDs).  Without triggering a 
request for review, the Secretariat could request these corrections as part of its completeness 
check, thus significantly decreasing the high volumes of requests for review.
35
                                                           
35 An analysis of all requests for review between EB32 and EB42 shows that 430 out of 750 questions from the EB to the DOEs 
are merely clarification requests. The procedure to request a review has thus been mis-used in over 50% for simple requests for 
clarification.  
 
  Of course there 
are issues where EB guidance is not so clear and which need to be considered by the EB in its 
role of policy definition. The ultimate responsibility will certainly continue to reside with the 
Board, but project review could be shifted even further to the Secretariat, avoiding unnecessary 
delays and allowing the EB to focus more on policy decisions.  20 
 
•  Distribution of work.  Outside  of  the work performed as members of Panels and Working 
Groups, the EB functions as a whole when it meets, and the agenda is always stretched beyond 
what can be achieved in the one-week time period. The EB could divide members into three 
groups or committees: one that reviews technical proposals on project approval for registration 
purposes, a second that reviews proposals on registration, and a third group that reviews 
methodologies. These committees would meet simultaneously with enhanced support from the 
Secretariat, and then report to the full Board for final approval. Taking into account concerns 
about accountability of the Secretariat (Streck 2008), such distribution of work and support from 
the Secretariat would have to go along with the adoption of clear procedural guidelines. 
•  Review of the EB’s Administrative Rules.  Currently, there are only a few formalized provisions 
governing the interaction between project proponents, the EB and its panels. Lack of clarity 
regarding communications, hearings and time lines often make processes cumbersome and 
opaque. From the perspective of project participants, there is a perception of insufficient and 
circuitous communication. At the same time, communication becomes unsatisfying, redundant 
and ineffective, when new queries are brought up in each round of review of a project and it is 
not clear how many of such review cycles may take place. As a result, there is an undefined 
period of legal and planning insecurity during which project participants have (i) to retain 
resources to answer an undefined and unlimited number of new questions, and (ii) have no 
indication on whether they can move ahead with developing the corresponding CDM project 
activities. Parties could consider the adoption of administrative due process rules governing 
communication amongst the various CDM actors (Streck and Lin 2008). The adoption of due 
process requirements would apply to any activities related to (i) the accreditation and 
withdrawal of accreditation of DOEs, (ii) the approval and review of baseline and monitoring 
methodologies; (iii) the registration, or rejection, of CDM projects; and (iv) the issuance, or 
refusal of issuance, of CERs. The objective of such rules would be that any person (DOE or 
project participant) with a direct and material interest in any of the abovementioned processes 
would have a right to participate by:  a) expressing an opinion and its reasons, b) having that 
position considered, c) be informed about the rationale of a particular decision affecting its 
rights and, eventually, d) having the right to appeal (see below).  
•  Role of DOEs. The relationship between the EB and the DOEs requires urgent improvement. 
DOEs are the extended arm of the EB, charged with ensuring that any project submitted for 
registrations meet all CDM requirements. However, the reality is that DOEs have not been 
performing to expectations and are in fact paralyzed due to capacity constraints. The vicious 
circle of performance is caused by presenting PDDs that do not comply with all CDM 
requirements and then having to respond to numerous EB requests for clarification and 
information. The past 6-9 months have seen a dramatic escalation of projects under scrutiny,
36
                                                           
36 For a graphic overview of the review history and trend see http://www.cdmpipeline.org/overview_8.htm. 
 
decreasing market value of projects by delaying registration and issuance. In addition, DOEs are 21 
 
expected to perpetually catch up with EB decisions in order to understand the implications of 
those decisions for the projects they are validating or verifying. While the retroactive nature of 
decisions has fortunately been eliminated by COP14, DOEs have been required to retroactively 
apply different guidance adopted by the EB, adding to further delays and insecurities.
37  DOEs 
argue that they are understaffed and that it is difficult to find qualified people. This is a dramatic 
failure of the market. The EB argues that DOEs should learn from the published EB reports. This 
denotes a failure to understand the responsibility of the regulator. DOEs cannot stand outside 
EB decisions -  they need to be incorporated more organically into the EB decision-making 
process. The recent approval of a Validation and Verification Manual should address the most 
pressing questions and insecurities. However, the EB reaches decisions with direct regulatory 
implications at every meeting and the DOEs should be the first to know and understand. Were 
the EB to clearly state the rationale for decisions on registration and issuance, DOEs and project 
proponents would be able to more effectively derive the lessons learned, and apply these in the 
preparation of future projects, over time improving the performance of DOEs. In turn this would 
allow the EB to refocus on strategic decisions, the provision of guidance and procedures and the 
general management of the CDM, refraining from project-by-project assessment of requests for 
registration/issuance, a practice not foreseen by the Marrakesh Accords. The project specific 
review needs to be replaced with a stringent and efficient accreditation and continuous 
assessment process resulting in well-trained DOEs. The EB has recently decided to undertake 
punitive measures for poorly performing DOEs and was supported in this direction by COP14, 
but this  arguably leads to a further deterioration of a strained relationship. Conventional 
wisdom dictates that preventive measures are more cost-effective than curative ones.
38
(II)  Improvements Requiring a COP/MOP Decision 
  
The above issues could be considered by the EB or by Parties for the current commitment period.  In 
addition, there are other elements which represent more fundamental changes to the CDM which are 
not likely to be considered for enactment before 2013 and would necessarily have to stem from a 
decision of the Parties. 
•  Professionalizing the EB. The current EB has been established as a United Nations committee, 
rather than as a professional regulatory authority overseeing the carbon market. This is not 
surprising, considering the roots of the CDM in international environmental treaty law. 
Nonetheless, the EB today is in the position of a  de facto market regulator. In order to 
effectively fulfill this role, a first step in this direction would be to professionalize the EB (Streck 
and  Lin 2008). Presently, the majority of its members have  a background in international 
environmental negotiations, not in market regulatory work (e.g. work experience in financial or 
energy regulatory authorities). As a result, the considerations of the EB tend to be oriented 
                                                           
37 During the review period, in over 20% the DOEs were forced to take into account guidance which was not yet available at the 
time of validation.  
38 In this regard 3 of 11 DOEs applying for re-accreditation have been asked by the EB to improve their procedures (GTZ 2008b). 22 
 
towards agendas raised during international negotiations rather than to the sort of issues 
related to the creation and maintenance of an efficient international market. The 
professionalization of the EB would require the recruitment of full-time salaried individuals 
whose collective experience spans the entire range of responsibilities (including project finance, 
law, business management, science) and is grounded in practical, project-level experience and 
knowledge of the CDM. The right of the various geographical constituencies to nominate EB 
members need not be affected, but nominations should be backed by the technical expertise 
and experience that the nominee can bring to the EB. Staffing the EB with professional staff will 
also help avoid conflict of interests since individuals are no longer made to serve several 
agendas and interests in parallel, and could devote themselves full time to the EB. To avoid 
conflicting interests before and after the time an individual serves on the EB, eligibility to the EB 
should be limited to individuals who did not hold a position that involved decision making on 
CDM-related matters for a defined period before serving on the Board and should be excluded 
from such offices for a time after they cease to be active EB members.
39
•  Review Mechanism. In addition, a review mechanism of the decisions of the EB could be put in 
place. It is a condition for a fair administrative procedure that those entities that are affected by 
the decisions of any regulatory body have access to a full and fair review of the decision. The 
COP/MOP decisions foresee a review procedure of some contested decisions when a decision 
improperly affects a Party’s interest. The review is conducted by the enforcement branch of the 
Protocol’s Compliance Committee.
 
40 These procedures however do not extend to non-Party 
participants in CDM projects. Under the existing guidelines, procedures and rules, the 
procedural rights of private parties are very limited. Affected project participants are afforded 
no opportunity for review of EB decisions. In order to strengthen quality and legitimacy of the 
EB’s decisions, the COP/MOP could establish an appeal mechanism which gives standing to 
individuals that are granted rights and obligations under the CDM and guarantees a full review 
of EB decisions (Streck 2007; Streck and Chagas 2008).
41 Such mechanism would give project 
participants, and other entities with rights and obligations under the CDM, standing to appeal 




 For that 
purpose, a competent panel established by the COP/MOP and composed of a small number of 
individuals could be charged with the responsibility of passing a final judgment on the subject 
matter under dispute.  
                                                           
39 Rules could e.g. be modeled after those applying to the World Bank Inspection Panel. 
40 Decision 27/CMP.1, Annex, Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, sections IX and X. 
41 An alternative remedy has been proposed by E. Meijer under which decisions of the EB would be open for review by national 
courts (Meijer 2008).  
42 An analysis of all requests for review between EB32 and EB42 found 88 projects where the question raised is either out of 
scope of a request for review, pertaining to guidance that was not available at the time of validation or simply a question based 
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5.2 A TREND-CHANGING MARKET MECHANISM 
The reductions achieved under the Kyoto Protocol will not make a dent in global emissions, and have 
had even less of an effect on emission trajectories. The decarbonization that the current CDM did not 
achieve in developing countries needs to be aggressively pursued in the post 2012 period. Historic 
economic growth has been based on increased fossil fuel energy consumption and consequently 
increased GHG emissions. Future economic growth particularly in developing countries must reverse this 
trend. While economic growth must continue and in fact accelerate, the efficiency of energy 
consumption must improve and the carbon intensity of production must swiftly decrease. Decoupling 
growth from emissions is the only way to pursue economic development and climate protection 
simultaneously, and this requires a radical shift in the policies that regulate the productive sectors.  
Unlike the current CDM, the next chapter of the carbon market must play an important role in 
introducing and implementing the policy changes needed to put developing countries onto a low carbon 
path. Policies have had an evolving treatment in the CDM.  Although it was never explicitly stated in any 
CDM modality, during the first few years of CDM operation there was an underlying assumption that the 
existence or introduction of a climate-friendly policy or regulation in a developing country would make a 
project in that sector non additional, and thus not eligible for the CDM. That perverse incentive was 
fortunately removed in 2005 by the EB with a ruling establishing that policies that encourage lower 
emissions need not take these policies into account in the baseline if the policy was implemented since 
the adoption of the Marrakesh Accords in November, 2001.
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It could be argued that programmatic CDM is a first step in the direction of promoting decarbonization 
by encouraging the enactment of  climate-friendly policies. Indeed, that was the original intent. 
Stemming from the firm conviction that the market needs to promote climate friendly policies and not 
just isolated projects, proponents tried to introduce the eligibility of policies and standards in the CDM 
during the COP/MOP negotiations held in Montreal in November, 2005. The objective of the proposal 
was to broaden the scope of the CDM by expanding the eligibility to emission reductions resulting from 
the adoption of particular policies or programs that would achieve emission reductions in multiple 
points over a period of time. Opponents argued that the modalities and procedures established for the 
CDM only allowed the eligibility of activities themselves. ‘Activities’ need to be directly tied to the 
introduction of a specific technology in a specific site, and emission reductions need to be directly 
attributable to the new technology. The compromise that was reached is encapsulated in the COP/MOP-
1 decision that gives rise to programmatic CDM:
 This decision effectively ensures that the 
introduction of a climate friendly policy will not adversely affect the quantification of emission 
reductions in the project activity. However, removing the perverse incentive from the CDM is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for promoting decarbonization. 
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43 EB 22, Annex 3 “Additional Clarifications Regarding the Treatment of National/Sectoral Policies and 
Circumstances” 
44 Paragraph 20, Decision2/CMP1 
 “A local/regional/national policy or standard cannot 
be considered as a clean development mechanism project activity, but project activities under a 24 
 
programme of activities can be registered as a single clean development mechanism project activity”. 
The decision differentiates between the existence of a policy (not eligible) and its implementation 
through specific activities (eligible). The new registration option allows for the aggregation of an 
unlimited number of activities implemented over time and throughout a region that can be as broad as 
encompassing various countries. The unlimited  aggregation begins to open the door to sectoral 
transformation. Nonetheless, emission reductions are still measured on the basis of specific activities 
(e.g. tons reduced by the installation of a particular technology), not on the basis of the improved 
overall performance of the sector (e.g. tons/kWhr in the electricity sector). The adoption of rules 
governing programmatic CDM was important for opening the CDM to projects in sectors that are highly 
dispersed over space and time (e.g. demand side energy efficiency, transportation, households, etc.). 
However, programmatic CDM continues to fall short of triggering the needed level of GHG emission 
reductions at the scale of whole economies.  
 
The next chapter of the climate regime must be built around the active and deliberate promotion of 
climate friendly policies throughout the developing world. In fact, policies should be front and center of 
any and all financial mechanisms that are developed for the future. The new mechanisms need to be 
constructed around the challenge of continuous improvement in national  carbon  intensity and 
efficiency, with rules that seek to improve the norm rather than merely differentiating the individual 
efforts that are better than the norm. 
 
Over the past few years a plethora of proposals has emerged suggesting options for making this shift. 
The proposals have surfaced both in the context of formal negotiation processes and as a result of the 
large amount of academic research, analysis and informal discussions on the future regime.
45
Arising from concerns over leakages and negative competitiveness effects associated with country-
specific mitigation commitments (IEA 2008), industry has taken the initiative to establish transnational, 
industry-led networks that promote climate change mitigation policies involving different sectors in 
developed and emerging countries alike. A key purpose is to avoid that competitiveness gains could be 
obtained through regulatory arbitrage, a particular concern for trade-exposed industries such as 
cement, aluminum, and steel, which are so energy intensive that they alone represent a significant share 
 Here we 
highlight the subset of proposals that revolve around sectoral concepts, as they seem to have most 
political attention. While authors take various perspectives on what has become the ‘silver bullet’ and 
overly used term “sectoral”, there are basically two groups of proposals with varying degrees of 
elaboration: those that stem from an agreement among industries that operate in the same sector but 
are located across different countries, and those that evolve from a national government decision to 
implement a specific policy or measure.  
 
Industry Agreements 
                                                           
45 Cosbey et al. (2007) describe 44 proposals which have been made within and outside of formal UNFCCC processes, and 
additional ones have emerged since then. 25 
 
of emissions (Egenhofer and Fujiwara 2008, Höhne and Ellermann, 2008). Transnational voluntary policy 
co-operations exist for the aluminum sector (under the auspices of the International Aluminum 
Institute, IAI), for the cement sector (Cement Sustainability Initiative, CSI, under the auspices of World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development), for the iron and steel sector (administered by the Iron 
and Steel Institute, IISI) and in the form of multi-sectoral, public/private partnerships (Asia-Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, APP). Under the IAI Agreement major primary 
aluminum producers, representing about 60% of the global market share (half of which is supplied by 
producers in non-OECD countries), committed themselves to cut perfluorocarbon (PFC) greenhouse gas 
process emissions by 80% and to reduce energy intensity by 10% by 2010. The Cement Sustainability 
Initiative, in operation since 2002, has thus far largely focused on capacity building (data collection, 
benchmarking and monitoring) but seems prepared to move to a second stage of concerted action, 
dedicated to policies and the establishment of potential intensity targets. The first stage alone has 
produced modest results (namely a 100 kg CO2 reduction per ton of production).
46
The private sector approach to sectoral crediting has three major flaws. First, it would need to be based 
on firm commitments, and yet the participation in private sector agreements is voluntary by definition. 
Second, even though industry today confesses wholeheartedly to the objectives of sustainable 
development and has proved willing to engage in a range of private or public/private transnational 
agreements to that purpose, the level and quality of commitments taken are meager. Only one of the 
agreements and transnational programs mentioned above has taken up firm targets (the IAI agreement 
on aluminum production); and these targets are neither overly ambitious (the commitment to reduce 
PFC emissions by 80% from 1990 levels was taken at a time, in 2003, when industry had basically 
reached this reduction already)
 The IISI, representing 
roughly 200 manufactures from all over the world (including China, India and Russia), responsible for an 
output of 70% of global iron and steel production (and more than  2 billion tons of annual CO2 
emissions), instigated programs among its members to enhance energy efficiency and recycling, 
establish best practices, cooperate in the research of application of low carbon technology, and provide 
comprehensive measurement and benchmark tools. The IISI also supports the public/private partnership 
APP which brings together the governments of Japan, Korea, China, India, the US, Canada and Australia, 
with the energy supply and energy-intensive industrial sectors. The APP aims at capacity-building, the 
proliferation of technology, and regulatory reform. Despite the participation of governments and 
industry-wide representation, no national or sectoral (‘top down’) targets are set or envisaged by the 
APP; rather the Program has chosen a ‘bottom-up’ action-based approach.  
 
47 nor overly obliging (the 10% energy intensity reduction promised for 
2010 seemed very distant in early 2008).
48
                                                           
46 Climate Change Corp, Climate News for Business, 8 October 2008  
http://www.climatechangecorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=5693. 
 Thirdly, voluntary commitments by private stakeholders are 
by definition outside the purview of the UNFCCC process where only states can enter into international 
47 IAI: Aluminum for Future Generations, Update 2007. http://www.world-aluminium.org/UserFiles/File/fl0000189.pdf. 
48 Reuters, 12 February 2008. 26 
 
agreements. Agreements that are reached in the realm of the private sector could be complementary 
to, but cannot substitute agreements reached among governments within the UNFCCC process.   
 
Government Actions 
Referred to by some authors as the “policy-based approach” (Sterk and Wittneben, 2005)
49
Proponents of the SNLT mechanism propose that crediting baselines be negotiated at the same time as 
Annex I country targets for post 2012 in order to avoid the need for proving additionality. However, 
benchmarking  has its own set of enemies, is very data-intensive and may not be realistic in some 
 but by 
others as a form of a “sectoral” approach (Bodansky, 2007, Bosi and Ellis, 2005), this approach centers 
on the generation of emission reductions by developing countries that adopt binding or non-binding 
policies, voluntary or mandatory standards that measurably reduce GHG emissions. Under the approach 
originally proposed by Samaniego and Figueres (2002) developing countries would develop regional, 
sectoral, sub-sectoral, or cross-sectoral mitigation efforts, which would be the result of specific 
sustainable development policies, measure the attained reductions against a sector wide baseline, and 
sell those on the international emission reduction market. The mechanism would be comparable to the 
CDM, but covering a whole sector rather than a particular activity. The intervention would be accredited 
to a government policy rather than a CDM motivated investment, but the reductions could be achieved 
by private sector with the necessary compensation by government. Governments could negotiate 
upfront funding against future emission reduction deliveries just as under the CDM, allowing countries 
to make the necessary institutional and regulatory investments. Alternatively, developing countries 
could make  commitments in the form of voluntary pledges of emission growth controls –  e.g. as 
proposed by the South-North Dialogue (Ott et al 2007).   
 
In order to assign some of the cost to developing countries and increase the net gain to the climate by 
not  converting all reductions into offsets, some authors have evolved the above concept toward 
Sectoral No-Lose Targets (SNLTs). Under SNLTs developing countries would voluntarily propose a 
domestic interest crediting baseline over a commitment or ‘management’ period of time which would 
be below the business as usual projection and be negotiated internationally. The country would reach 
the crediting baseline through domestic efforts, and would then be allowed to sell any surplus emission 
reductions which are achieved beyond the crediting baseline, but would have no penalty for not 
achieving that baseline. Two variations have emerged under the SNLTs concept, one by the Centre for 
Clean Air Policy (Schmidt et al 2006) and the other by Ecofys/GtripleC (Ward et al 2008). In the CCAP 
version international benchmarks would feature explicitly as a negotiation parameter, i.e. to draw links 
with the performance of these sectors in industrialized countries for competitiveness reasons. By 
contrast,  Ecofys/GtripleC have developed sectoral proposal templates, the purpose of which is to 
provide a standardized tool by which countries can prepare and propose crediting baselines without 
referring to international benchmarks.  
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countries or some sectors (Eggenhofer et al 2008, Ward et al 2008), particularly if the target date of 
agreement is COP15 at the end of 2009. Furthermore, SNLTs make sense for larger developing countries 
with a stable investment climate that seeks to significantly scale up private sector investment according 
to their sustainable development priorities, and where current carbon market policy tools, such as the 
various forms of CDM, are not considered adequate to the task (Ward et al. 2008). The aggregation of 
revenue potential could provide financial leverage sufficient to transform the sector over a 10-20 year 
period. Developing countries will however be careful to not accept any target that would operate as a 
cap on development. They are therefore likely to argue for setting baseline emissions on the basis of the 
national emission intensity of the sector in question. Having intensity baselines requires  both the 
parameters in the numerator and denominator to be measurable - and measured, reported and verified, 
which will limit the applicability of SNLTs for some time (Ward et al 2008). Developing countries will also 
avoid any mechanism that is perceived as a back door strategy to push them into binding national 
targets. A notable exception is the discussion of a crediting mechanism for reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD),  the most advanced of all negotiations on sectoral 
crediting, where the negotiations seem to take a direction towards a SNLT (UNFCCC 2007).   
   
Given where we are in the international negotiations, with the USA still not on board and the other 
industrialized countries not agreeing to a 25-40% reduction by 2020
50
                                                           
50 According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC industrialized countries need to reduce their emissions 25-40% below 
1990 by 2020, in order to have a 50% chance to stabilize global temperatures at 2ºC above pre-industrial levels.  
 
, it is unlikely that by the end of 
2009 developing countries will agree to move into a crediting mechanism that is any more stringent 
than that based on the enactment of emission reducing policies or regulations which are aligned with 
their own sustainability goals, are domestically measured and can be independently verified. Such move 
would correspond to moving up one step in the previously discussed gradual incorporation scheme. This 
may not seem like much of a shift from business as usual, but in reality, empirical evidence shows that 
countries (developing and industrialized) are actually not implementing policies that lead to the 
decarbonization of growth. The climate regime could  act as the necessary catalyst, with strong 
incentives and a transparent and predictable market mechanism as a financial basis for decarbonization 
in the South.    
 
In order to be successfully implemented, the expanded mechanism would require major alterations to 
the carbon market as we know it, if only to safeguard the integrity of a system that will trigger 
mitigation efforts at a scale heretofore unknown. Taking into account the risk of driving emission 
reduction prices down by enabling high supply levels, the comparative advantages of market based 
against non-market based mechanism will have to be carefully assessed. Parties would decide whether 
this new market channel is created inside the CDM under the guidance of the EB (but with modalities 
different to those of Marrakesh), or whether it should have a separate structure and regulating body.  
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In any case, the following issues would need to be addressed:  
 
•  At the mitigation level, the logic of the system needs to evolve from focusing on the project 
activity to focusing on the policy that spurs the emission reductions. Decarbonization will simply 
not occur without the necessary regulatory framework. Only regulatory certainty will stimulate 
an adequate and reliable new source of risk capital to finance technology shifts on the scale of 
whole economies. In addition to promoting activity-based emission reductions  as in the 
traditional CDM, the next (or expanded) emission reduction mechanism must promote the 
necessary sector-wide transformation, attained by cost effectively channeling capital and know-
how to decarbonize carbon intensive sectors such as energy, transport and infrastructure 
(Figueres and Newcombe 2007). The focus of the market would have to shift “from measuring 
tons to affecting trends” (Figueres 2007a). 
•  At the  financing level, mitigation action needs to be appropriately rewarded reflecting the 
different strengths and constraints of private vs public financing. The conditions under which 
the private sector accepted the CDM as an international incentive mechanism include: (i) low 
exposure to host country risk, which in the CDM is limited to the issuance of a letter of approval; 
(ii) ability to control project risk and independence of carbon credit allocation to an individual 
project from broader policy failure; and (iii) despite all flaws, trust that the international 
governance structure will reward emission reductions with tradable carbon credits. 
Governments on the other hand rarely act as carbon speculators. They are unlikely to create 
budget lines on the basis of a future promise of carbon credits unless they receive a price 
guarantee and assurance that credits will actually be issued. Experiences with the establishment 
of AAU-backed Green Investment Programs in countries with an overallocation of AAUs in 
Eastern Europe have shown that trading of carbon credits by governments, even if they come in 
the form of allocated allowances as in the case of AAUs, raises issues related to state budget 
rules, sale of state assets, ownership of emission rights, constitutional limitations, predictability 
of funding, allocation of proceeds.
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•  At the crediting level, governments could have the right to propose sectoral crediting schemes 
involving tradable carbon credits or opt for other negotiated and determined incentives (e.g. 
cash, loans, guarantees). Performance could be measured against an agreed and adopted 
baseline, a SNLT or any other performance indicator. The mechanism could foresee the 
allocation of tradable carbon credits based on a reduction of emissions below a certain baseline. 
In order to reduce the price risk governments could negotiate the sale of the credits in advance 
against a fixed price per ton of CO2e reduced. Annex I Governments would have to decide 
 As a result, the sale of AAUs from these countries has been 
very limited. Turf battles among ministries and questions on a fair price of carbon have further 
paralyzed the sale of carbon credits on the state level. Lessons learned from this process could 
help in designing a post-2012 incentive system which takes into account the need for stable and 
predictable funding of government agencies.  
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whether they will open private carbon markets to these credits; if not, other offtake agreements 
would be needed to give developing countries the assurance that there is demand for emission 
reductions. Alternatively, governments could also opt not to receive tradable carbon credits and 
negotiate a cash based reward system. This would spare governments the additional 
complication to manage and sell carbon credits, while at the same time reduce the supply of 
credits to international carbon markets. A private sector crediting scheme, the CDM or a JI-like 
mechanism, could be integrated into the system to attract private sector financing against the 
reward of tradable carbon credits. Double counting would have to be eliminated by deducting 
emission reductions that form part of an activity based crediting mechanism from government 
achievements. 
•  At the administrative level, an international regulatory body would have to administer the 
mechanism and any agreements concluded/programs approved. To ensure consistency among 
various mechanisms, the mandate of such regulatory body – either a reformed Executive Board 
or a newly constituted body- could include the management and supervision of an expanded, 
sectoral crediting mechanism. This body would have to be composed of professional regulators 
who understand and have expertise in the relevant sector. Technical experience should 
therefore be the governing criterion for the selection of relevant experts. 
The participation of private sector entities in a sectoral crediting mechanism would require the 
establishment of administrative procedures that ensure a transparent, legitimate and fair 
process. This would imply the establishment of a due process based on administrative 
procedures on the international and relevant laws on the national level. Where carbon crediting 
takes place on the government level,  laws would have to  ensure that rights  to emission 
reductions from a particular actor or activity are transferred to governments and that the initial 
holders of emission rights are duly compensated. 
 
5.3 A NON-MARKET MECHANISM 
While the CDM has shown to be an effective vehicle for stimulating investment into emission reductions 
in developing countries (and the above trend-changing market mechanism would be even more 
effective) it encapsulates the major flaw of creating offsets which are used to cover emissions 
elsewhere, and hence do not contribute to limiting/reducing overall global emissions. That situation was 
acceptable during the first commitment period within a relatively low level of reduction effort, but it 
may not be environmentally tolerable after 2012 when higher reduction expectations will prevail.    
 
Furthermore, while during the first commitment period demand and supply seem to be approximately 
in balance, in the post 2012 period supply may overwhelmingly dwarf demand. The demand for 
emission reductions by 2020 will obviously depend on the outcome of the current negotiations, but the 
update of the Investment and Financial Flows paper of the UNFCCC shows the below table  summarizing 
four demand estimates, none of which surpasses 1.7 GtCO2 (UNFCCC 2008a).  30 
 
 
Estimates of the potential annual demand for international offsets by 2020. 
Source  Potential annual demand 
New Carbon Finance
52 twice or thrice today’s levels (1,000 to 1,500 MtCO2e)   
IDEACarbon
53 500 to 1,200 MtCO2e   
Point Carbon
54 1,700 MtCO2e   
Barclays Capital
55 600-1,100 MtCO2e   
 
The same paper assesses the abatement potential of the developing world at approximately 5 Gtons by 
2030 in sectors currently eligible under the CDM, plus an additional potential of at least 1.6 Gtons in 
reductions of emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) (UNFCCC 2008a) which are not 
included in the current CDM. Obviously the full technical abatement potential will not be realized, but 
the mere order of magnitude evidences the striking imbalance between low demand from industrialized 
countries and much greater possible supply on the part of developing countries for the post 2012 
period.  
 
Leaving the environmental integrity of offsets aside for the moment, the above imbalance dictates a 
necessary restriction to the supply of carbon credits. Above we proposed one way which would aim at 
integrating market and non-market elements into the tool box available for funding emission reductions 
from a particular sector. Another way to reduce supply would be to extract certain sectors from the 
market and provide the needed financial support through specialized abatement fund(s).  
 
If the decision is to exclude particular sectors from a market mechanism, the following ones would be 
possible candidates: 
 
•  Industrial gases. Having completely dominated the early market, industrial gases (HFCs, PFCs 
and N2O) in June 2009 still represent 27% of the CER supply until 2012.
56
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th January 2008. 
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54  Point Carbon (2008). Carbon Market Transactions: Dominated by Financials?”, Carbon Market Analyst 
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55  Barclays Capital (2008). “So long to the longs”, Monthly Carbon Standard (June 2008). This is the 
 (annualized) estimate of the maximum potential demand. 
56 www.cdmpipeline.org 
 The role of the market 
in continuing support for industrial gas elimination post 2012 needs careful thought. As the cost 
of their elimination is quite small, the substantial capital flows to purchase these assets would 31 
 
continue to divert from the tougher task of contributing to sustainable development by 
decarbonizing the energy sector and urban growth, a situation which is not recommendable in 
the long run. With the bulk of these gases now eliminated, most developing countries could be 
expected to require their continued elimination as a production standard. In addition the OECD 
could consider a grant program for the poorer countries that have such facilities to ensure that 
they have the incremental funds to install the required catalysts and incineration equipment and 
operate this as per the Multilateral Fund for phase out of Ozone Depleting Substances (Figueres 
and Newcombe 2007).  
•  REDD.  Negotiations on a REDD crediting mechanism are more advanced than comparable 
negotiations in other sectors. This is the more surprising as REDD has been deliberately excluded 
from the CDM and the crediting of emission reductions and removals from forestry activities has 
been controversial throughout the history of climate negotiations (Streck and Scholz 2006). In 
2005, Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea brought the topic back to the agenda when they 
signaled willingness to reduce emissions from deforestation provided an acceptable incentive 
mechanism would be put in place.
57 There is now an agreement to incorporate the sector in the 
next chapter of the international climate regime.
58
•  Demand side energy efficiency. While redirecting investments towards more efficient and low 
carbon technologies is crucially important, there is a very substantial amount of mitigation 
potential in energy efficiency in industries, buildings and transport systems. Indeed the findings 
of the IPCC Working Group 3 suggest that energy efficiency provides the greatest short-term 
mitigation potential and provides for  one of the most cost efficient ways to reduce GHG 
emissions. A very substantial portion of the mitigation potential in energy efficiency measures is 
in buildings, industry and the transport sector. This is typically characterized by a very large 
number of small actions. While programmatic CDM will open the door for emission reductions 
from energy saving measures, recent studies (Hinostroza 2007, Figueres and Philips, 2007), point 
 Disagreement continues however on the 
source for the funding, with some countries pushing for REDD to be included in the future 
market mechanism and other countries proposing the establishment of a specialized fund that 
would pay for the global environmental service of reducing deforestation emissions without 
creating international offsets. Given the fact that REDD is of such potentially high volumes, 
dependent on good policies and governance, Parties  may  consider  an international funding 
mechanism that makes funds available in stead or in parallel to a market based approach (e.g. 
Norway has already pledged USD 1 billion to the Brazil Amazon Fund). Taking into account a 
history of government failures to reduce deforestation, it would however be desirable for an 
effective REDD mechanism to complement government funding with a private sector driven 
mechanism that channels funds into forest conservation.    
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to significant remaining constraints. Given these challenges it may be worth to devise non-
market based mechanism to incentivize emission reduction by saving energy. One promising 
option could be the creating of a revolving loan fund that would finance investments in demand 
side energy efficiency and be repaid at a relatively fast pace through the energy savings 
achieved.  
An alternative and potentially more nuanced approach to deal with a potential oversupply of carbon 
credits is to distinguish between different sectors and investment forms which determine the eligibility 
of various financial mechanisms. Project based investment could continue to generate tradable carbon 
credits, while policy change would be supported by alternative and more predictable funding sources. 
Participation of a country in a sectoral GHG abatement mechanism would gradually lead to a more 
involved participation in the longer term. Project activities could be implemented without any further 
delay, while the country prepares a strategic abatement plan covering the emissions of a particular 
sector. Funding for the successful implementation of policies could also be rewarded with carbon 
credits, cash or other financial incentives.  
 
In order to contribute effectively to the scale up of mitigation, the non-market financial mechanism 
would, as in the case of the new market mechanism described above, have to operate on the sectoral 
level. In principle, the concept is not much different from the Sustainable Development Policies and 
Measures (SD-PAM) proposal originally suggested by Baumert and Winkler (2005), where they focus is 
on large-scale policies and measures, not individual projects. Developed countries would support the 
voluntary efforts of developing countries, both financially and through technology transfers, but not on 
the basis of the purchase of offsets.  
 
Many questions remain unanswered by this non-market financial mechanism, but perhaps the most 
important is the actual appetite industrialized countries might have for such funding, considering there 
would be no emission crediting. Another question relates to the predictability and stability of any 
particular funding source. The details of the mechanism will have to be answered by the negotiations. 
However, industrialized countries could be reassured by the fact that any distribution of funds would be 
success based, rewarding only those emission reductions that have actually occurred, as confirmed by 
measurement, reporting and verification. 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
The gradual and incremental approach that has been outlined above is the “path of least resistance” to 
the next iteration of financial mechanisms for long-term (2013 and beyond) mitigation.  As we continue 
with the international negotiations for the future climate regime, options that can be agreed to by all 
nations are constrained by the current political constellation. Some industrialized countries have been 
actively engaged in mitigation efforts over that past ten years, others with even more responsibility 
have been remarkably absent. The science requires both groups to reach a level of comparable effort of 
deep  reductions, and to do so in a manner that is within the environmentally determined time 
urgencies.  Developing countries are united in their expectations of leadership on the part of 
industrialized countries but are differentiated in terms of their own capacity to contribute to the 
solution. At a time in which rapidly emerging countries are focused on economic growth, the science 
requires them to initiate efforts to deviate from uncontrolled emissions, and to soon impose some type 
of emission growth  restrictions.  However, neither the North nor the South is  racing to respond 
appropriately to the scientific evidence of climate change. Entrenched in their traditional defensive 
positions that reflect a deep lack of trust of the other side, both sides are currently only willing to 
contribute to a solution that represents the minimum common denominator, and is at best gradual and 
incremental. It would therefore not be surprising that the financial mechanisms which are devised for 
the immediate post 2012 mitigation in developing countries would reflect the incremental nature of 
engagement.  
 
There is however one factor that could substantially alter the path forward, and that is the global 
financial crisis. A traditional interpretation of the crisis would foresee even less engagement on climate 
given the dwindling availability of capital. Ironically, it is also possible that this is precisely the pressure 
that is needed to radically shift the course of events. Over that past six months governments and public 
opinion have been convinced that the financial crisis is real, and that a solution is urgent. This conviction 
has unleashed unprecedented levels of public sector capital. The Bush administration invested USD 2.6 
trillion, and the Obama  administration added  a stimulus program of USD  850  billion. These public 
expenditures are curative in nature and do not necessarily contribute to more sustainable financial 
structures.   
 
In contrast, the financial flows study of the UNFCCC (2007) estimates that climate stabilization could be 
achieved for USD 200 billion/year, but those investments would substantially contribute not only to 
facing the climate challenge but also to long term energy security for all. There is a striking difference 
between the willingness to rapidly invest in the financial system and the willingness to invest, even in a 
gradual manner, in energy systems. It is not so much the profound implications of the impending climate 
crisis (the last three years have largely dispelled the myth that climate change is not real) but rather the 
lack of a conviction of urgency. Despite the increased level of discourse on the veracity of the situation, 
the challenge is still assessed for its long-term implications and not in its need for immediate changes in 
behavior and investment.   
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However, the financial meltdown is already being seen by some visionaries as a fortuitous opportunity 
to avoid a long-lasting climate meltdown. The low carbon agenda can act as an engine for job creation 
and economic recovery while at the same time increasing energy and climate security. Rather than 
approaching the climate challenge in a defensive and gradual mode, countries could make a strategic 
investment to dramatically improve efficiency in buildings and power, and to replace 19th century 
technologies that depend on carbon-based fuels with 21st-century technologies that use renewable 
fuels, all as part of a concerted effort to revive and redirect the economy in industrialized countries as 
well as in developing nations. Contrary to historical behavior, the challenge of solving the climate crisis 
could move us into the realization that we now live in a multipolar world, where solutions cannot be 
implemented only by a very few. The recent G20 meetings are a first evidence of what could be a 
profound shift in global power and influence. A new world order that incorporates emerging economies 
into the solutions group, albeit gradually, is a sound harbinger of durable frameworks.   
 
We stand at a critical juncture in the evolution of the climate regime. We can either go forward with 
trepidation incurring the risk of doing too little too slowly, or push ahead with conviction, assuming the 
risk of having averted the major part of an impending disaster while setting the context for long-term 




NATIONALLY APPROPRIATE MITIGATION ACTIONS  
In preparation for an agreement that will be based on the leadership of all industrialized nations, but will 
necessarily also involve participation of at least some developing countries, most of the fast growing 
developing countries have been internally analyzing their projected emission growth paths, in order to 
identify opportunities for cost effective mitigation over the next 10-20 years. In contrast to the 
European Union that has explicitly inserted its intended reduction commitment into the realm of the 
multilateral negotiations, developing countries have announced the results of their analysis as internal 
assessments, and have been cautious about prematurely inserting these into the international 
negotiations. Nonetheless, the preparatory work has been done in expectation of the political moment 
in which the rest of the industrialized nations come forward with their respective commitments.  
 
China - China is already implementing a wide range of energy and industrial policies that, while not 
driven by climate change concerns, are contributing to climate efforts by slowing the growth of China’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. China’s 11th Five-Year Plan includes a major program to improve energy 
efficiency nationwide, including a goal of reducing energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of 
GDP) by 20% below 2005 levels by 2010. The government projects that meeting this target would 
reduce China’s greenhouse gas emissions 10% below business as usual; researchers estimate about that 
over 1.5 billion tons of CO2 reductions would be achieved.
59




India - In June, 2008, Prime Minister Singh released India’s first National Action Plan on Climate Change 
(NAPCC) outlining existing and future policies and programs addressing climate mitigation and 
 acknowledges the importance of urgent and 
concerted action on climate change mitigation and adaptation. The Strategy emphasizes Mexico’s 
willingness to engage in more ambitious climate change framework than that established by the Kyoto 
Protocol and its willingness to adopt long-term targets of a non-binding nature.  The two sectors 
targeted for mitigation effort are energy and land use change and forestry.  The 2007 Strategy identifies 
a total mitigation potential of 107 Mtons in the energy sector by 2014 (representing a 21% reduction 
from BAU over the next six years) from end use energy efficiency, increase in the use of natural gas, and 
increase in the cogeneration potential in the cement, steel and sugar industries . However the bulk of 
Mexico’s mitigation potential comes from the land use sector. The Strategy identifies a mitigation 
potential that ranges from 11  to 21 billion tons CO2 in the land use and forestry sector by 2012,  most 
of which will come from public reforestation and private planting, and will depend on the level of 
available resources.  
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adaptation.   The plan identifies eight core “national missions” running through 2017 and directs 
ministries to submit detailed implementation plans to the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change 
by December 2008.
61
South Africa -  In July 2008 the government of South Africa approved a progressive policy on climate 
change that puts the country on a low carbon economic development path.
 Emphasizing the overriding priority of maintaining high economic growth rates to 
raise living standards, the plan “identifies measures that promote our development objectives while also 
yielding co-benefits for addressing climate change effectively.”   The missions include:  tripling 
renewables to 10% of installed capacity by 2012; 500% increase in nuclear power (to 20GW) by 2020; 
decreasing 7% of coal plants by 2012 and another 10,000MW by 2017, and increasing energy efficiency 




  The policy calls for 
emissions to peak at 546 megatons of carbon by 2025 and decline in absolute terms by 2030-35.  One of 
the measures being considered is a carbon tax, introduced by the Minister of Finance in his Budget 
Speech in February 2008. The Cabinet has mandated the National Treasury to study a further carbon tax 
as a potential option. Other measures being considered are stringent vehicle   standards, 
the development of 10,000 gigawatt hours of energy from renewable energy sources by 2012, 
mandatory use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) for all new coal-fired power stations, and the 
increase in nuclear generation.  
 
South Korea -  Korea has not formalized its post 2012 intent in written form.  However, in August 2008 
Amb. Rae-Kwon Chung, chief climate negotiator for the country, announced that South Korea would 
adopt a national carbon reduction target next year.  A few months later he called for the establishment 
of an international registry for developing countries to record their domestic emission reduction   
policies. Registering would be voluntary, but laying out a domestic policy would translate into an 
international commitment that could be monitored and verified. 
 
Brazil - in October 2008 the Minister of the Environment of Brazil announced that Brazil could achieve a 
10-20% reduction of emissions from 2004 during the period 2012-2020, presumably by reducing illegal 
deforestation rates. However, the government warned that these reductions are conditional to certain 
international prerequisites, which the Brazilian government will announce at a later date.   
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Comment 
In the event of a political agreement that would harness the above contributions from developing 
countries, the operational challenge the regime will have to face is how to track and monitor the 
mitigation contribution of countries that operate with a variety of measurements. The issue is absent in 
the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol where the only metric is national absolute emissions 
with respect to 1990 levels. As can be seen, the various mitigation efforts intended by these countries 
for the post 2012 period have different metrics and different reference dates, making comparability a 
difficult task. And yet, measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) are critical elements of the 
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